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Many observers have blamed HMOs for increasing financial pressures on private hospitals and
causing them to cut back on the provision of charity care. We examine this issue using data on all hospital
discharges in California between 1988 and 1996. We find that public hospitals in counties with higher
HMO penetration do take on a larger share of the county's charity caseload. However, these public
hospitals also take on larger shares of most other types of patients. At the hospital level, we find little
evidence that either for-profit or non-profit private hospitals respond to HMO penetration by turning away
uninsured and Medicaid patients. On the contrary, in the for-profit sector higher HMO penetration is
linked to reductions in the share of privately insured patients in the caseload, and corresponding increases
in the share of Medicare patients and Medicaid births. Since HMO penetration reduces the price paid by
privately insured patients they may be less attractive to for-profit hospitals relative to the publicly insured.
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I.  Introduction 
Despite large expansions in public health insurance programs over the 1990s, the fraction 
of Americans without health insurance has hovered between 14 and 16%.  For many years, the 
provision of hospital services to this population has been cross-subsidized by the privately 
insured (Aaron, 1991).  For example, the American Hospital Association (1986) estimated that 
there was a "hidden tax" of 10.6% on the average paying hospital patient, which was used to 
subsidize charity care.   
Managed care organizations may threaten this arrangement by squeezing hospital profits 
that are used to finance charity care.  The rise of managed care organizations, and a resulting loss 
of hospital market power to health plans and insurers, have been identified by some analysts as 
"primary forces" affecting hospital revenues (c.f. Duke, 1996), and the ability to finance charity 
care (Lipson and Naierman, 1996).  It is argued that in response to these pressures private 
hospitals will reduce their provision of charity care, which in turn will increase the burden on 
public hospitals (Reinhardt, 1986; Lewin and Lewin, 1987).   
These developments have not gone unnoticed by the press.  The Los Angeles Times 
reports that in Los Angeles County the share of charity care provided by public hospitals 
increased from 67% to 75% between 1993 and 1995, and says that "to a substantial degree, this 
unwelcome change can be blamed on the growth of managed care companies, whose 
compensation policies for private hospitals have greatly diminished the resources that hospitals 
can provide for indigent care" (Tranquada, July 5, 1999). 




charity cases away from private hospitals and towards public hospitals.  In order to test this 
hypothesis, we use data on all hospital discharges within California between 1988 and 1996, to 
examine changes in the share of each county's charity caseload being treated at public hospitals, 
as well as changes in individual hospitals' shares of charity discharges in their caseloads.   
We consider several different types of charity patients, including the uninsured, Medicaid 
births and other Medicaid patients. Medicaid typically reimburses hospitals at about half the rate 
of private insurers, and the uninsured are unlikely to reimburse hospitals for the full cost of their 
care.  However, Medicaid patients are clearly more lucrative (or at least, less expensive) than 
similar patients without health insurance.  And within the Medicaid-eligible population, women 
admitted to deliver may be more profitable than other patients.  Thus, even if hospitals do not 
reduce their overall share of charity patients, they may take steps to alter the composition of their 
charity caseloads. 
We find that public hospitals in counties with higher HMO penetration do take on a larger 
share of the county's charity caseload.  However, public hospitals in these markets also take on 
larger shares of most other types of patients, including the privately insured.  This observation 
suggests that HMO penetration is linked to the exit of private hospitals from the market, rather 
than to attempts to reduce the fraction of charity patients in the caseloads of individual hospitals.  
We also examine a panel of hospitals that were in existence throughout the sample 
period, and find little evidence that either for-profit or non-profit private hospitals in this sample 
responded to HMO penetration by turning away uninsured and Medicaid patients.  On the 




private patients in the caseload, and corresponding increases in the share of Medicare patients 
and Medicaid births.  Our interpretation of this result is that HMO penetration reduces the price 
paid by privately insured patients, making them less attractive to for-profit hospitals.  These 
hospitals respond by turning away from these patients towards the next most lucrative groups, 
Medicare patients and Medicaid moms.   
When we examine data on hospital revenues and costs, we find some evidence that 
increasing HMO penetration is associated with a reduction in revenues per discharge in public 
hospitals, which is not offset by a corresponding reduction in costs.  Private hospitals are able to 
avoid these changes, perhaps by choosing healthier patients within each group. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows.  Section II provides background on the growth 
of managed care, how hospitals can act to alter their caseloads, and previous evidence regarding 
the relationship between the competitiveness of hospital markets and the provision of charity 
care.  Section III outlines a model of the provision of charity care.  The data is described in 
Section IV, and Section V delineates the empirical strategy and specification issues.  Section VI 
lays out the results, and Section VII discusses the results and conclusions. 
II.  Background 
a) The Rise of Managed Care 
Between 1987 and 1997 the fraction of the privately insured who were enrolled in Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), the most restrictive form of managed care, increased from 
16 to 48% nationally.  Over the same period, the fraction enrolled in Preferred Provider 




The tremendous growth of managed care over the 1990s has had important effects on the 
health care market.  Many analysts have attributed a slow down in the growth of costs of medical 
care to MCOs (c.f. Cutler and Sheiner, 1997).  In addition to the strong emphasis on cost 
containment within plans, managed care organizations create competitive pressures on other 
providers to reduce costs (Baker, 1995, 1999; Baker and Shankarkumar, 1997; Noether, 1988).  
These pressures may in turn lead to a reduction in the provision of charity care by hospitals and 
other providers. 
 Table 1 shows trends in HMO enrollments for each county in California.  It is evident 
that there is a great deal of variation in enrollment rates both within and between counties.  Table 
1 also illustrates the large increase in HMO penetration that took place in California over our 
sample period.  The fraction of the population enrolled in HMOs rose from 28% in 1988 to 
43.6% in 1996. 
b) How Do Hospitals Affect Their Caseloads? 
  It is one thing to argue that hospitals wish to alter their patient mix, and another thing to 
show that they can actually do so.  Hospitals are subject to federal laws which prohibit them from 
turning away women in labor if they accept any Medicare funds, and they are prohibited from 
turning away emergency patients in an unstable condition.  The latter practice is called "patient 
dumping".  A recent report by the consumer group Public Citizen finds that these illegal practices 
are in fact remarkably common (Public Citizen, 2001).  Of the 500 hospitals that had confirmed 
violations of anti-dumping laws in 1997, 1998 and 1999, only 85 had been fined as of April 




insurance information before a screening is provided and/or contact health plans for authorization 
of screening exams.  These practices are also illegal if they result in delayed treatment.  
Unsurprisingly, uninsured patients and patients whose HMOs did not include the violating 
hospital in their networks were most likely to be dumped. 
   In one recent case, an 18 month old Los Angeles girl died of an infection that could have 
easily been treated with antibiotics.  The girl belonged to an HMO, but was taken by ambulance 
to a hospital outside her network.  The hospital consulted with the HMO which said she should 
be transferred to a network hospital, even though she was suffering a fever of 106 and was 
extremely ill.  The girl was eventually transferred to the HMO hospital, where she died.  The first 
hospital was found guilty of "dumping" the little girl, since they refused to treat her without a 
guarantee that they would be reimbursed by the HMO.   
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this case for our purposes is that the California 
Supreme Court ruled that hospitals that refuse to treat medically unstable patients are protected 
by a state cap on jury awards of $250,000 even if they violate federal laws against patient 
dumping.  The lawyer representing the girl's mother commented that this cap renders the federal 
anti-dumping statutes "moot" in California, since hospitals can dump patients without the risk of 
incurring large financial penalties (Dolan, March 26, 1999). 
A less extreme tactic than dumping is to deny indigent patients certain services.  A class 
action lawsuit was recently filed against a Los Angeles County hospital which required Medi-Cal 
patients in labor to pay $400 cash on-the-spot for epidurals.
1  State officials have termed these 
     




actions "improper" since it is illegal to charge extra fees to Medi-Cal patients.  However, it does 
not appear that the hospital has faced any regulatory action from state or federal agencies, and in 
response to the scandal the state legislature found it necessary to enact a statute specifically 
outlawing this practice (of charging for epidurals) (Bernstein, June 17, 1999).  It seems safe to 
assume that pregnant women who knew that they would be denied anesthesia would avoid this 
hospital if at all possible. 
Similarly, hospitals are free to specialize in services that are attractive to desirable 
patients, and to eliminate services that attract less desirable patients.  For example, hospitals can 
upgrade the quality of their obstetrical services, open special clinics catering to elderly patients, 
or close down their trauma units.  Increasingly, hospitals that maintain trauma units are “closing” 
them to incoming ambulances when they are overcrowded, thus avoiding severely ill patients.  
Hospitals can choose what type of translation services to make available, and how to advertize 
these and other services.  One large hospital in the Los Angeles area recently ran a bill-board 
promotion that advertised free carseats with each delivery.  Anecdotes of this type indicate that 
hospitals go to considerable lengths to influence the composition of their caseloads. 
c) Previous Evidence re: Hospital Competition and Charity Care 
The idea that competition will squeeze private hospital revenues and result in the 
provision of less charity care predates the recent rise in managed care.  Using data from private, 
non-profit hospitals in New York, Thorpe and Phelps (1988) construct a county Herfindahl index 
and find that hospitals operating in more competitive markets provide significantly less 




Hospital Association and the Urban Institute.  They find that many hospitals reported adopting 
explicit limits on charity care when they faced revenue constraints.   
Frank, Salkever and Mitchell (1990) examine a sample of private non-profit Florida 
hospitals and find evidence of a strong "income effect" in the provision of charity care.  This 
result implies that factors that squeeze hospital profit margins may reduce the provision of 
charity care.  They contrast this result with Frank and Salkever (1991), who find negligible 
income effects in a sample of Maryland private non-profit hospitals.  They speculate that the 
differing results may be due to differences in the regulatory environments in the two states--
hospitals in states like Maryland, where rates are strongly regulated, may have less latitude to 
increase charity care when incomes rise.  These results suggest that there are advantages to 
looking within a large state such as California over time, since changes in the regulatory 
environment that affect all hospitals can be controlled for using year effects. 
Sloan, Morrisey and Valvona (1988) estimate models of the percentage of hospital 
discharges that were "self-pay" patients where the independent variables included the percent of 
the local population that was enrolled in HMOs, as well as characteristics of the county 
population, and measures of each hospital's structure (size, ownership, and teaching status).  
They found little evidence that HMO enrollments mattered, but their regression models pool 
public and private hospitals, so that they do not examine the question of whether the charity 
caseload is shifted from one type of hospital to another. 
Finally, Gruber (1994) examines the effects of managed care on the provision of 




variations in managed care penetration across hospital markets, he relies on a model in which the 
effects of managed care penetration are larger in less concentrated hospital markets.  The study 
has a difference-in-differences design in which the provision of uncompensated care in more 
competitive and less competitive markets is examined before and after legislation allowing 
payers to negotiate prices with hospitals took effect.
2  The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that managed care reduces charity care since the provision of charity care fell by more 
in the competitive hospital markets than in the uncompetitive ones between 1984 and 1988. 
In summary, the previous literature suggests that increased competition is usually 
associated with reductions in the extent of charity care provided by private non-profits.  
However, it provides little evidence regarding the effects of HMOs on public hospitals per se, 
and most studies predate the recent large increases in HMO penetration.   Our study differs from 
most previous ones by examining all types of hospitals (public, private for-profit, and private 
non-profit), and by estimating both county-level and hospital-level models which include 
hospital specific fixed effects.  As we argue below, the latter innovation allows us to control for a 
broad range of hospital characteristics in our analysis. 
III. A Model of the Provision of Charity Care 
a) Private Hospitals 
     
2 The legislation was introduced in late 1983, and Gruber’s data starts in 1984.  However, he argues that you 
would expect the effects of the legislation to be stronger at the end of his sample period (1988) than at the beginning. 
Why do private hospitals supply charity care?  Several models have been advanced in the 
literature.  A purely altruistic hospital provides charity care because its owners or trustees derive 




will respond to reductions in the amount of charity care provided by other hospitals by increasing 
their own supply (Frank and Salkever, 1991).  For example, if non-profit hospitals are the 
"altruists" then non-profits may increase the provision of charity care if for-profits cut back.  If 
the "warm glow" derived from providing charity care is a normal good, then the provision of 
such care should also increase with hospital income.   
On the other hand, Frank and Salkever (1991) and Frank, Salkever, and Mitchell (1990) 
point out that even for-profit hospitals have an incentive to provide charity care.  For example, 
being seen to provide such care may have an important impact the hospital's relationship with 
regulatory agencies.  An attractive feature of this model of a self-interested hospital is that it can 
be applied to both for-profit and non-profit private hospitals.   
Our model builds on this insight, as well as Hadley and Feder's finding that hospitals 
reported adopting explicit limits on charity care when they faced revenue constraints.  We also 
allow for altruism as a motive for providing charity care.  As we show below, the way that 
hospitals react to an HMO-induced reduction in the price paid by their privately insured patients 
can have a positive or a negative effect on the amount of charity care provided, depending on 
whether current period revenue constraints are binding.  
Let Q be the total number of patients cared for, and R=Qc/(Qp+Qc) be the fraction of 
charity patients.  The subscript c denotes "charity" and the subscript p denotes a privately insured 
customer.  We assume that any benefits the hospital derives from treating charity patients accrue 
in the future.  These benefits f(R) have the property that f'(R)>0 and f"(R)<0.  The benefits 




sometime after the patient is actually treated.  
The hospital's maximand is given by 
(1) (1-R)PQ + RPcQ - C(Q) + f(R), 
where P is the price paid by a privately insured patient, Pc is the payment received for treating a 
charity patient, and C(Q) is the hospital's cost function.  Note that Pc could be equal to zero, as 
long as P>Pc.  We also assume that C'(Q)>0 and C"(Q) >0.  The hospital must choose Q and R. 
We further assume that hospitals are subject to a revenue constraint that must be satisfied 
in each period.  Thus, the hospital's problem is to maximize (1) subject to: 
(2) [(1-R)P + RPc]Q - C(Q) >= π
0, 
where π
0 is the minimum revenue the hospital requires.  
Since Q does not affect f(R), the firm chooses Q in order to maximize profits and we can 
define:  
(3) π(R,P) = maxQ [(1-R)P + RPc]Q - C(Q) for all P. 
Since P>Pc and C is convex, then  πP > 0 and  πR< 0, for all R between 0 and 1.  Hence, the 
hospital’s problem is to choose R to maximize π(R,P) + f(R) subject to π(R,P) >=  π
0. 
In this model, HMOs are assumed to act by reducing P, the price paid by privately insured 
patients.  The key question then is what happens to R as P falls, that is, what is the sign of 
δR/δP?   The hospital will find itself in one of three possible cases.  In the first case 
 π(0,P) < π
0 and there is no solution to the problem (the firm goes bankrupt).   
Alternatively, let R
*  be the value that maximizes π(R,P) + f(R) and suppose that R* is 
between 0 and 1.  Then  πR(R
*,P) +  f’(R




order conditions are also satisfied.  Hence: 
(4)  πRR(R
*,P) + f”(R
*) < 0 and 
(5) [πRR(R
*,P) + f”(R
*)] (δR/δP) + πRP =0. 
Rearranging terms, δR/δP = -πRP /[πRR(R
*,P) + f”(R
*)].  Here, the denominator is less than zero 
and the numerator can be signed by noting that  πR = (Pc- P)Q so that: 
(6)  πRP = -Q + (Pc- P)δQ/δP, 
which is less than zero.  Hence if revenue constraints do not bind, δR/δP < 0 and hospitals will 
substitute towards charity care when the price paid by privately insured patients falls. 
In the third case, π(R*,P) + f(R*) < π
0 and π(0,P) > π
0 so that the current period revenue 
constraint is binding.  In this case, the hospital will choose R to set π(R,P) = π
0 and δR/δP = - πP 
/πR  > 0 since πR < 0 and  πP > 0.  Thus, as Hadley and Feder suggest, it is only when current 
revenue constraints are binding that the hospital will decrease the fraction of charity patients in 
its caseload in response to a reduction in the price paid by the privately insured customers.  
Hospitals that are able to borrow from a parent corporation, for example, may be able to take a 
longer-term view. 
This model can easily be extended to situations in which there is more than one class of 
charity (or paying) patients.  For example, below we will consider uninsured patients, Medicaid 
mothers and their babies, and other Medicaid patients as charity patients.  We also include 
Medicare patients as a separate class of "paying customers".  The average Pc's, costs, and longer-
term benefits (f(R)) associated with these different classes of patients are all expected to vary.  




it is difficult to make firm predictions about which groups hospitals switching away from the 
privately insured will move to, for example.  Medicaid mothers may be more profitable than the 
other two classes of charity patients.  But it is possible that hospitals receive more longer-term 
benefits from treating the uninsured than they do from delivering Medicaid mothers.  In what 
follows, we treat the relative desirability of different classes of charity and paying patients as an 
empirical question.   
Much of the previous work on charity care has drawn a sharp distinction between for-
profit and non-profit hospitals.  For example, as discussed above, many analysts only examine 
non-profits, implicitly assuming that for-profits do not supply charity care.  However, Pauly 
(1987, page 262) argues that "ownership differences turn out to be much less important than they 
might seem...nominal ownership structure seems to matter much less than fundamental economic 
incentives".  Moreover, Norton and Staiger (1994) find that while for-profit hospitals tend to treat 
fewer uninsured patients than private not-for profit hospitals, this is largely because they tend to 
locate in areas with fewer uninsured.  These important locational effects will be incorporated in 
our empirical models by using hospital fixed effects. 
In terms of our model, an important potential difference between for-profits and non-
profits is whether they are affected differently by current revenue constraints, on average.  If for 
example, non-profits have a fiduciary responsibility to balance the books each year, while for-
profits are able to take a longer-term view, then it may be non-profits rather than for-profits that 
reduce indigent care in response to pressures imposed by HMO penetration.  For-profits and non-




altruism as a motive for providing charity care.  In what follows, we allow the effects of HMO 
penetration to vary between for profits and non profits. 
b) Public Hospitals 
Public hospitals are intended to provide a "safety-net" for patients who cannot get care 
elsewhere.  Thus, if patients are denied necessary care in private institutions, we expect them to 
receive it in public ones.  Moreover, the financial incentives for public hospitals are muted by 
their reliance on government subsidies.  Public hospitals that run a deficit receive "bailouts", 
while those that improve their financial performance are likely to see their subsidies reduced.  
This discussion suggests that public hospitals can be viewed as passively accepting the residual 
caseload that remains after private hospitals have chosen their markets. 
This portrait may be overly simplistic, however.  Even if public hospitals have little 
control over the composition of their potential clientele, they still have some discretion about 
whether or not someone should actually be admitted rather than being served in another setting.  
It is possible that by changing the mix of services provided, the number of hospital admissions 
could be reduced.  In fact, the Los Angeles County-University of Southern California hospital is 
currently under considerable political pressure to adopt reforms intended to accomplish this goal 
by providing more preventive and outpatient care.   
Still, even if public hospitals act very aggressively to change their admitting practices, 
they are still likely to be affected by changes in private hospital caseloads.  If private hospitals 
respond to increasing HMO penetration by reducing their charity caseloads, some fraction of 





a) County-Level HMO Enrollments 
We make use of two sources of data about HMO enrollments, the Group Health 
Association of America (GHAA, 1988-1991) and Interstudy (1992-1996).  The unit of 
observation in both data sets is the HMO, and total enrollments are reported for the entire HMO 
service area, which may include several counties.  Following Baker and Shankarkumar (1997), 
county-level data on HMO penetration rates are constructed by allocating the enrollments of each 
HMO to the counties in its service area using the county's population, summing over all the 
HMOs in the county, and dividing by the county's population.
3  
We use GHAA data from 1988 to 1991, and Interstudy data for 1992 to 1996.  GHAA 
reports HMO service areas for the entire period, while Interstudy reports them only from 1992 
onwards.  However, the GHAA's description of service areas appears to become less precise over 
time.  GHAA enrollment numbers refer to December of the relevant year.  In order to maximize 
comparability with the Interstudy data, which is reported bi-annually, we use the enrollment 
numbers from January of the following year.  For example, the Interstudy number for 1992 is 
actually taken from January 1993.  Table 1 indicates that there may be some discontinuities 
between the GHAA and the Interstudy data, however.   
     
3 Data on county populations comes from the Census bureau. 
Errors may also be introduced by our procedure of allocating HMO enrollments to 




estimate the effects of HMO penetration.   However, the Baker and Shankarkumar procedure we 
follow may also introduce non-random measurement error that will tend to attenuate the 
estimated effects of HMOs.  In particular, suppose that an HMO’s caseload tends to be 
concentrated in the county in which it is head quartered, rather than evenly distributed over all of 
the counties that it serves, and that counties with HMO head quarters tend generally to have 
higher penetration rates (because they are more urban, for example) .   Then the procedure we use 
will tend to understate the amount of variation in HMO penetration rates (by understating the rate 
in high penetration areas and overstating it in low penetration areas).   Baker and Shankarkumar 
test for this possibility by constructing an alternative measure of penetration rates that takes head 
quarter locations into account.  However, they report that the two measures of HMO penetration 
are highly correlated and yield very similar estimation results.  
b) Hospital-Level Data 
Information about California's hospitals is available annually from the Office of 
Statewide Healthcare Planning and Development (OSHPD). The California Hospital Disclosure 
Data gives detailed information about each hospital’s ownership and financial status.  The 
California Hospital Discharge Data has information about every hospital discharge 
(approximately 3.65 million per year), including the patient's primary expected payer and basic 
demographic information (such as race and age).  We also use information about the diagnosis to 
identify women admitted for childbirth and their infants, since this is the single largest category 
of Medicaid recipients.  We use the data on primary expected payer to identify the fraction of 




includes "self-pay", charity, no charge, and county indigent patients.
4     
Our measures of the fraction of care provided to charity patients (R) include the fraction 
of discharges represented by: either Medicaid or uninsured patients; uninsured patients only; 
Medicaid patients only; Medicaid mothers and infants; and other Medicaid.  In addition to these 
measures, we examine the fraction of discharges accounted for by Medicare patients, and the 
fraction accounted for by the privately insured. 
     
4 Although the patient's primary expected payer may be a somewhat noisy measure of the actual payer, these data 
will be used to calculate our outcome measures and hence measurement error in these data should not bias our 
estimates. 
Our analysis proceeds at two levels.  First, we examine data at the county level to see 
whether the fraction of the county's charity caseload that is cared for in public hospitals increases 
with HMO penetration.  These analyses make use of the entire available sample of discharge 
data, with two exclusions.  First, we exclude one small county that did  not have both a public 
and a private hospital.  Second, we include only discharges from general acute-care hospitals, and 
exclude institutions such as psychiatric hospitals and chronic care facilities. 
    An examination at the county level is perhaps the most natural way to address the 
question of whether HMO penetration is increasing the charity care burden on public hospitals.  
However, it is possible, that despite controls that are described further below, county-level 
regressions do not capture what is going on at the individual hospital level.   For example, 
suppose that HMO penetration causes changes in practice style which result in fewer 
hospitalizations at private hospitals overall, while public hospitals retain more conservative 




at public hospitals would rise, but this might not be because any patients were actually shifted 
from private to public hospitals.  Alternatively, if private hospitals exited the market at a faster 
rate than public hospitals over the sample period, then this could cause the charity caseload at 
public facilities to rise, even if the caseload mix at the remaining private hospitals showed little 
change over time.  Moreover, it is difficult in county-level models to control adequately for 
factors such as the Disproportionate Share Program (discussed further below) which may have 
caused a shifting of patients between public and private hospitals within counties.  
Hence, we supplement our analysis of the county-level data with an analysis of the 
behavior of individual hospitals that is based on a fixed panel of the hospitals that existed in each 
year of our data.  This sample includes data on 3528 hospital years, or 392 hospitals per year.   
Table 2 shows changes over time in the charity caseload at the county level by type of 
hospital ownership.  These figures demonstrate that although the share of charity patients treated 
by private hospitals is small relative to the share of other patients, private hospitals still treat the 
majority of these patients.  Moreover, private for-profit hospitals treat a significant share of 
uninsured and Medicaid patients.  In 1996, 15% of such patients were treated in these hospitals, 
which illustrates the importance of including both for profit and non-profit hospitals in our 
sample. 
Looking at shifts over time, Table 2 confirms that there is an increase in the fraction of 
uninsured patients treated at county hospitals between 1988 and 1996, but this is offset by a large 
reduction in the share of Medicaid patients treated at public facilities.  The largest shift over time 




than they did in 1988 (as Duggan, 2000 notes) but private hospitals also take a growing share of 
other Medicaid patients over time.  Finally, public hospitals see reductions in their Medicare 
caseloads, but increases in the privately-insured category. 
Table 2 also shows that there was some turnover in the hospital market over our sample 
period.  Between 1988 and 1996, the number of hospitals shrank from 472 to 441.  These losses 
were distributed over hospital types as follows:  The number of private for-profit hospitals shrank 
from 135 to 116, the number of private non-profits fell from 243 to 240, and the number of 
public hospitals fell from 94 to 85.  Thus, the largest percentage reduction in the number of 
hospitals occurred in the private for-profit sector.      
Table 3 illustrates the large differences in the caseload mix of public and private 
hospitals.  The table is divided into two parts, one corresponding to the entire available sample of 
hospitals whether or not they existed in each year, and the other corresponding to our fixed panel 
of hospitals.  As Table 3 indicates, this smaller sample includes 823 observations on private for-
profit facilities, 1966 on private non-profit hospitals, and 739 observations on public hospitals.  
The patterns of discharges are very similar between these two samples, however.  Thus, in what 
follows we describe the patterns in the full sample. 
Table 3 shows that on average, 58.9% of public hospital discharges were Medicaid and 
uninsured patients compared to 28.1% and 24.6% in private for-profit and non-profit hospitals 
respectively.  Private for-profit hospitals have higher shares of Medicaid births than private non-
profits--in the former, 13.7% of discharges are Medicaid births compared to 10.9% in the latter.  




shares of uninsured though they have slightly lower shares of "other Medicaid" patients.
5 
Finally, Table 3 shows that private for-profit hospitals take on the lowest revenue, lowest 
cost patients on average, while public hospitals take the highest revenue, highest cost patients.  In 
the for-profit sector, revenues tend to outweigh costs by a couple of hundred dollars per 
discharge, while in the public sector, costs outweigh revenues, on average. 
V.  The Empirical Model and Specification Issues 
a) County-Level Analysis 
This paper is motivated by the widespread perception that by squeezing private hospital 
profits, the rise of managed care has resulted in a shifting of charity patients from private to 
public hospitals.  We saw above that an increasing fraction of each county's uninsured population 
is being treated at public hospitals, but it is not clear that this shift has been caused by HMOs.   
     
5 The fraction of the privately-insured caseload that is enrolled in managed care is higher in private non-profit 
hospitals (59.6) than in for-profit hospitals (54.3).  But at 37.3%, it is much lower in public hospitals than in either 
type of private hospital.  Thus, although the privately insured caseload is a smaller percentage of the total at public 
hospitals, it is composed of a larger fraction of fee-for-service patients. 
In order to try to isolate the effect of HMOs we estimate a model of the following form: 
 
(7) PCHARITYct = ac + a1HMOct + a2PROJMEDct + a3PROJUNct + a4COUNTYct + a5YEARt + 
ect,  
 
where PCHARITYct is the share of a county's given type of charity care that is provided by public 




vector of time-varying variables measuring the industrial composition of county employment, the 
distribution of firm sizes, and average wages, PROJMEDct and PROJUNct are the projected 
shares of the county’s caseload of Medicaid and uninsured hospital patients, respectively, YEARt 
is a vector of year effects, and ect is an error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
included exogenous variables.  The reasons for the inclusion of these variables, as well as further 
details about their construction, are given below. 
The characteristics of the county may be expected to influence the amount of charity care 
provided.  The Frank and Salkever (1991) model shows, for example, that the private provision 
of charity care will respond positively to perceived need, other things being equal.  To the extent 
that characteristics such as the fraction of the local population that is poor and minority are 
relatively constant over time, these characteristics will be captured by the inclusion of county 
fixed effects.  The structure of the hospital market at the start of the sample period will also be 
captured by the county fixed effect.  
The time-varying variables that are most important to control for are those which are 
likely to be correlated both with our measures of HMO penetration, and with the private 
provision of charity care in the county.  Three candidates come to mind.  The first is the number 
of Medicaid patients in the county.  The generosity of Medi-Cal was rising rapidly over our 
sample period, as was HMO penetration.  Although the income cutoffs for Medi-Cal were 
established state-wide, and can be captured by year effects, the impact of changes in these cutoffs 
is likely to have varied greatly from one area of the state to another, depending on the income 




In order to capture these effects, we include PROJMED.  This measure is intended to 
capture the way that changes in the generosity of the Medicaid program would have been 
expected to affect each county's 1988 hospital caseload.  To construct this measure, we use a 20 
percent sample of our individual-level data (approximately 700,000 observations per year) and 
estimate linear probability models of the probability of Medicaid coverage in each year of our 
data.  These models included dummy variables for age, race, sex, and each individual's 4-digit 
home zip code as control variables.
6  We use zip codes, since information about income is not 
available.  Because the generosity of Medicaid coverage was expanding rapidly over this period, 
the probability that a person with particular characteristics was covered will be much higher in 
1996 than it was in 1988.  Estimating separate regressions for each year generates coefficients 
that capture these effects.  
We then apply the estimated coefficients obtained from each year’s models to the county's 
1988 hospital discharges, in order to obtain the share of this fixed patient population that would 
be predicted to have Medicaid coverage in each year.  The use of a fixed sample of patients 
insures that PROJMED is independent of changes in the composition of discharges that might 
themselves be caused by increasing HMO penetration.   That is, a county that had many “working 
poor” families might have been expected to increase its share of Medicaid-covered patients over 
time, solely because the probability that local residents became covered increased over time.  Our 
measure captures this effect.  
     
6 The regressions included a dummy variable for each year of age between 0 and 19, and then dummies for each 4 
year interval thereafter (e.g. 20-24, 25-29,...) up to a dummy for age >=85.  The reason for entering single year of 




Second, increases in Medicaid coverage were accompanied by decreases in private health 
insurance coverage and increases in the uninsured population.  While some of the decline in 
private health insurance coverage can no doubt be attributed to the crowding-out of private 
insurance by public insurance, declines in private health insurance coverage predate recent 
expansions in public insurance coverage (Cutler and Gruber, 1996, Currie and Yelowitz, 2000). 
Reductions in the rate of private health insurance coverage and increases in the uninsured 
population could be expected to put pressure on the ability of hospitals to provide charity care, 
even in the absence of managed care penetration.  And private health insurance coverage could 
well have been falling more rapidly in some counties than in others.  County-level data on the 
prevalence of private health insurance coverage and the size of the uninsured population are not 
available.  However, the same algorithm that is used to create PROJMED, is used to create 
PROJUN.   
In addition, we control for factors underlying changes in the provision of private health 
insurance by including annual, county-level measures of the distribution of firm sizes and of the 
industrial composition of employment (since some types of jobs are more likely to have health 
insurance than others) in COUNTY.  These data are taken from County Business Patterns data 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).  Hoynes (1996) suggests that these data provide more reliable 
measures of labor force at the county level than small area unemployment statistics. 
Third, increases in costs could also be expected to squeeze revenues, leading to possible 
reductions in charity care.  Since the largest component of hospital costs is labor, COUNTY 




Patterns data.  We calculate this wage measure at the health service area (HSA) level.  HSAs are 
conglomerations of counties that define regional health care markets.  There are 26 HSAs 
compared to 58 California counties.
7   
Lastly, the introduction of the Disproportionate Share Program (DSH) in 1990 may be 
expected to affect the distribution of charity caseloads across hospitals by giving private hospitals 
an added incentive to treat charity patients.  Under DSH, hospitals in which the percent of total 
revenues attributed to Medicaid and uninsured patients exceeded 25% received payments which 
rose non-linearly with the fraction of low-income patients.  Duggan (2000) shows that private 
hospitals responded to DSH by increasing their share of indigent patients, but that they did this 
primarily by targeting Medicaid births rather than other types of Medicaid or uninsured patients.  
It is also noteworthy that Duggan does not find any significant difference in the responses of 
private for-profit and non-profit hospitals to DSH.   
Given hospitals' ability to alter their caseloads endogenously in response to DSH, it is not 
desirable to include the hospital's DSH number in each year of the data.  Instead, Duggan 
controls for the effect of the DSH program by including each hospital's "low income number" 
(i.e., the amount of revenue derived from charity patients) measured at a fixed point in time at the 
beginning of his sample period.  Since DSH is expected to alter the distribution of indigent 
patients across hospitals within counties, county fixed effects are an imperfect control for the 
effects of DSH.  The statewide introduction of the program and average changes in its effects 
over time will be captured by the inclusion of time dummies, but the fact remains that the effects 
     




of DSH may not be well controlled in county-level models, since DSH had very different effects 
on different hospitals within the same county. 
b) Hospital-Level Analysis 
When we turn to hospital-level data, we estimate a model very similar to (7), which takes 
the form:   
(8) CHARITYht = bh + b1HMOct + b2HMOct*PRIVATEht + b3PRIVATEht + b4COUNTYct + 
b5PROJMEDht + b6PROJUNht + b7YEARt + b8PRIVATEht*YEARt + vht,  
 
where CHARITYht is a measure of the fraction of the hospital's caseload devoted to a particular 
type of charity care, bh is a hospital fixed effect, HMOct is a measure of managed care penetration 
in the county, PRIVATEht is an indicator equal to one if the hospital is privately owned,  
COUNTYct is the vector of county employment, firm size, and wage measures that was described 
above, PROJMEDht and PROJUNht are the projected shares of the hospital’s caseload of 
Medicaid and uninsured patients, respectively, YEARt is a vector of year dummies, and vht is an 
error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the included exogenous variables.  Note that in 
(8) we allow the year dummies to differ depending on whether the hospital is publicly or 
privately owned.  These year effects will capture factors such as differential rates of change in 
admitting practices between the private and public sectors.  The standard errors are also corrected 
(using the “cluster” command in stata) to allow for correlations within counties and years.  
The hospital fixed effects control for many important factors that could be measured as of 




start of the DSH program (i.e. Duggan's measure of the effect of DSH), as well as the hospital's 
size and caseload mix, and the range of services the hospital offered.  
The algorithm used to calculate the projected hospital level shares of Medicaid and 
uninsured caseloads, PROJMEDht and PROJUNht, follows that used in calculating projected 
county shares.  Instead of using the county's 1988 sample of discharges, we use each hospital's 
1988 sample of discharges, and use the estimated coefficients to calculate the fraction of that fixed 
sample of discharges that we would expect to be covered by Medicaid or uninsured in each 
subsequent year.  The use of a fixed sample of discharges in this case means that PROJMED and 
PROJUN will not capture changes in hospital caseloads that are themselves caused by increasing 
HMO penetration. 
We also estimate models which allow the effects of HMO penetration to differ depending 
on whether or not private hospitals are for-profit or non-profit.  These models take the following 
form: 
 
(9) CHARITYht = dc + d1HMOct + d2HMOct*PRIVATEhct + d3HMOct*PRIVATEht*NONPROFht + 
d4PRIVATEht + d5PRIVATEht*NONPROFht + d6COUNTYct + d7PROJMEDht + d8PROJUNht + 
d9YEARt*PRIVATEht + d10YEARt + uht.  
 
In this specification, the effects of HMO penetration on public, private for-profit, and private non-
profit hospitals are given by d1, d1+d2, and d1+d2+d3, respectively. 




about HMO penetration, but not about other forms of managed care.  However, if HMO 
penetration and PPO penetration in California move together, as they do in the national data, then 
variation in our measure will capture movements in overall managed care penetration.  Moreover, 
since HMOs are the most restrictive form of managed care, it is of interest to study their effects.   
A second problem is that our estimates of the effects of  HMO penetration may be biased towards 
zero by measurement error, as discussed above. 
Finally, it is important that our exogenous variables adequately control for factors that 
influence both caseloads and HMO penetration.  As a specification test, we have estimated all our 
models excluding the measures in the vector COUNTY.  This change in specification had little 
effect on the estimated effects of HMO.  We attribute this result to the fact that much of the 
variation in county characteristics is already accounted for by the inclusion of hospital fixed 
effects. 
 IV. Results 
a) County-level  Models 
  Table 4 shows estimates of equation (5), where the dependent variables are the county 
shares of various types of charity and non-charity patients who are served at public hospitals.  To 
ease interpretation of the estimated coefficients, the means of the independent variables are shown 
in the final column.   Table 4 shows that HMO penetration increases the share of a county's charity 
caseload that is served at public hospitals.  In particular, public hospitals in areas with higher HMO 
penetration appear to be serving a greater share of the uninsured and other Medicaid patients.  




insured and Medicare caseloads.  In fact, increases in HMO penetration have approximately the 
same estimated effect on all four of these shares.  A 50% increase in HMO penetration is estimated 
to increase each share by approximately 10 percentage points. 
Table 4 also shows that in counties with higher predicted Medicaid caseloads, a larger 
fraction of uninsured patients, and a smaller fraction of Medicaid patients (and especially Medicaid 
births) is served at public hospitals.  Counties with higher predicted uninsured caseloads also see a 
smaller proportion of Medicaid patients being served at public hospitals.  The other county-level 
control variables for industrial composition, employer size, and wages are sometimes significant in 
the models of the share of Medicaid, private payer, and Medicare patients treated in public hospitals.  
In general, variables associated with a higher fraction of the county's Medicaid births occurring in 
public hospitals, are associated with a lower share of private and Medicare patients being treated in 
these hospitals. 
In summary, while it is true that the fraction of charity cases served by public hospitals has 
increased with HMO penetration (as the LA Times article quoted in the introduction observed), it is 
not clear that this is due to a reduction in the share of charity patients served within individual private 
hospitals.  These county-level estimates may reflect a combination of two factors.   First, there may 
have been a more rapid reduction in the number of private relative to public hospital beds in some 
markets such as Los Angeles that had rapidly growing HMO penetration.  We will return to this 
possibility in the discussion section below.  Second, the combination of county-level fixed effects and 
year dummies may not adequately control for the effects of DSH, which is expected to cause the share 




that the share of county Medicaid births served in public hospitals is not increasing. 
We conducted one further experiment using the county level data.  We interacted our 
measure of HMO penetration with the fraction of beds in the county that were private in 1988.  
The idea was to see whether the impact of HMO penetration was different in markets that were 
more or less well served by public hospitals at the beginning of the period.  We choose to use data 
from the beginning of the period in this analysis because HMO penetration could affect the 
fraction of beds that were private.   These results were suggestive since the coefficient on the 
interaction was generally negative and of similar magnitude to the positive coefficient on HMO 
penetration.  However, it was never statistically significant .  
b) Hospital-Level  Analysis 
  Table 5 shows our estimates of equation (8).  The first column suggests that the fraction 
of Medicaid and uninsured patients rises with HMO penetration for public hospitals.  In particular, 
the public hospitals’ share of Medicaid and uninsured patients rises by approximately 8 percentage 
points with a 50% increase in HMO penetration, while private hospitals' shares do not fall 
significantly.  Our attempts to break out the charity caseload into its components were not very 
successful, but the point estimates suggest that much of the increase in the fraction of charity 
patients at public hospitals is due to an increased share of Medicaid births.  In contrast, private 
hospitals see small reductions in the fraction of their caseload accounted for by Medicaid births 




There are a number of factors operating over our sample period which combined to 
produce a strong shift of Medicaid births away from public hospitals and towards private 
hospitals, as seen in Table 2.  First, the DSH program created powerful incentives for private 
hospitals to increase the share of "Medicaid moms" served.  Second, the increasing generosity of 
Medicaid is likely to have increased the share of Medicaid mothers served by private hospitals, 
since lower middle-class women who might previously have gone to such hospitals as uninsured 
customers gained Medicaid coverage.   
Since HMO penetration rose at the same time that these policies were implemented, a 
failure to properly control for them would tend to produce a spurious positive correlation between 
HMO penetration and the share of Medicaid births in private hospital caseloads.  Hence, the fact 
that we find a small negative effect rather than a positive one, suggests that we have effectively 
controlled for these policies. 
Given that we have included hospital fixed effects in these models, the indicator for 
"private" is identified by hospitals that converted from public to private ownership.  The third row 
of Table 5 indicates that hospitals that underwent this conversion actually increased the share of 
charity patients in their caseloads, and reduced the number of privately insured patients.  One 
possible interpretation of this result is that given the negative publicity associated with takeovers 
of public hospitals by private operators, newly private hospitals go out of their way to cultivate 
good publicity by increasing charity care.  Alternatively, as our model suggests, both for profit and 
not-for-profit hospitals have incentives to provide charity care and a for-profit hospital may be 




The signs of PREDMED and PREDUN are roughly as one would expect.  Higher 
predicted shares of Medicaid patients are associated with higher actual shares of Medicaid patients 
as well as lower shares of uninsured and privately insured patients, and higher shares of Medicare 
patients.  Higher predicted shares of uninsured patients are associated with higher actual shares of 
uninsured patients, and lower shares of other types of patients. 
Table 6 shows estimates of equation (9), which highlights differences between private 
for-profit and non-profit hospitals.  The estimated effects of HMO penetration in these regressions 
are very similar to those shown in Table 5.  Table 6 shows, however, that there are some 
significant differences between private for-profit and non-profit hospitals in terms of the way that 
they respond to increasing HMO penetration.   
Our estimates indicate that private for-profit hospitals react to increases in HMO 
penetration by moving away from private customers towards both Medicare patients and Medicaid 
births, as predicted by our model.  The last portion of the table shows that when compared to the 
means shown in Table 3, the estimates in Table 6 imply that a 50% increase in HMO penetration 
would cause for-profits to reduce their share of private patients by 34.8%, and increased their 
shares of Medicare patients and Medicaid births by 24.6% and 39.4%, respectively.  On the other 
hand, non-profit hospitals show small and statistically insignificant effects of HMO penetration on 
caseloads. 
In summary, there is little evidence here to support the hypothesis that HMO penetration 
is causing existing private hospitals to reduce their charity caseloads.  On the contrary, private for-




their caseloads, and expanding the share of Medicare patients and Medicaid births.   On the other 
hand, public hospitals do see an increase in the fraction of their caseloads accounted for by charity 
care, perhaps in response to private hospital closures. 
The pattern of patient shifting that we observe in the for-profit sector is exactly what one 
might expect on the basis of our model:  In response to a decline in the payments received from 
the privately insured, for-profit hospitals reduce the share of such patients and increase the share 
of Medicare patients and Medicaid births who have become relatively more lucrative.  The fact 
that we find an effect for for-profit hospitals increases our confidence in the validity of our 
negative results for non-profits.  That is, if we had examined non-profits alone and discovered that 
there was no statistically significant effect of HMO penetration, then we might have suspected 
that this result was due to measurement error in our measure of HMO penetration, for example.  
The fact that we find significant results for for-profits using the same measure makes this 
explanation unlikely.    
c) Effects on the Bottom Line 
One of the main reasons for public concern about patient shifting caused by HMOs, is 
that it may place a financial burden on public hospitals.  Concerns about the bottom line are 
addressed in Table 7, which shows estimates of the effects of HMO penetration on revenues per 
discharge and cost per discharge.  These models take the form of equation (9), except that the 
dependent variables are the logs of revenues and costs per discharge.  The models are estimated 
using robust regression techniques because of the possibility of outliers in the revenue/cost data.
8   
     
8 Specifically, we used the rreg command in STATA with the default settings.  The standard errors in these 




Although the coefficients are imprecisely estimated, these models indicate that HMO 
penetration is associated with reductions in revenues per discharge in the public sector which are 
not offset by reductions in costs.  In the private sector however, there is little evidence of a decline 
in revenues.  In fact, private non-profits appear to show an increase in revenues, which is largely 
offset by an increase in costs.  Thus, these estimates suggest that HMO penetration may be 
associated with a shifting of sicker patients from private to public hospitals, and that private 
hospitals are able to take steps to shield themselves from the adverse financial impacts of HMO 
penetration, if not through patient shifting then through other means.  
It is interesting to note that higher predicted Medicaid and uninsured caseloads are 
associated with lower revenues.  Higher predicted uninsured caseloads are also, however, 
associated with lower costs per discharge, pointing to lower treatment intensity.  A higher fraction 
of the county population being employed in large firms is associated with higher hospital 
revenues, perhaps because of the link between firm size and the generosity of health insurance 
coverage. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
  We find that public hospitals take on a larger share of the charity caseload in markets 
with higher HMO penetration.  Some commentators have interpreted this finding as evidence that 
private hospitals are turning away charity patients who then end up at public hospitals.  However, 
we find little evidence that individual private hospitals were turning away charity patients in our 
fixed sample of hospitals.  This finding suggests that HMO penetration increases the burden on 




Cutler, 1999).  Unfortunately, given the relatively small number of exits over our sample period, 
we were not successful in establishing a direct link between HMO penetration and hospital entry 
and exit, but this is clearly an important subject for future research.  Moreover, many hospitals 
appear to have joined (or been taken over) by hospital networks rather than exit the market.  This 
phenomena also bears further investigation.  
The main evidence of patient shifting is found in the for-profit sector, where higher HMO 
penetration is linked to reductions in the share of private patients in the caseload, and 
corresponding increases in the share of Medicare patients and Medicaid births.  Our interpretation 
of this result is that HMO penetration reduces the price paid by private patients, making them less 
attractive to for-profit hospitals.  These hospitals respond by turning away from these patients 
towards the next most lucrative groups, Medicare patients and Medicaid moms. 
When we examine data on revenues and costs, we find some evidence that increasing 
HMO penetration is associated with a reduction in revenues per discharge in public hospitals, 
which is not offset by a corresponding reduction in costs.  Private hospitals may be able to avoid 
these changes by choosing healthier patients within each group.  In this case, increasing HMO 






  References 
 
Aaron, Henry. Serious and Unstable Condition: Financing America's Health Care (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution) 1991. 
 
American Hospital Association. Cost and Compassion: Recommendations for Avoiding a Crisis in 
Care for the Medically Indigent, Chicago, 1986. 
 
Baker, Laurence. "Association of Managed Care Market Share and Health Expenditures for Fee-for-
Service Medicare Patients", Journal of the American Medical Association, CCLXXXI (1999), 432-
437. 
 
Baker, Laurence, "HMOs and Fee-For Service Health Care Expenditures: Evidence from Medicare", 
NBER Working Paper #5360, 1995. 
 
Baker, Laurence and S. Shankarkumar, "Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures: Evidence from 
Medicaid, 1990-1994", NBER Working Paper #6187, 1997. 
 
Barro, Jason and David Cutler, "Consolidation in the Medical Care Market Place: A Case Study from 
Massachusetts", NBER WP #5957, March 1997. 
 
Bernstein, Sharon. "Women Denied Epidurals File Class-Action Lawsuits", Los Angeles Times, 
Thursday June 17, 1999. 
 
Currie, Janet and Aaron Yelowitz.  "Health Insurance and Less Skilled Workers."  Finding Jobs: 
Work and Welfare Reform, David Card and Rebecca Blank (eds.) (New York: Russell Sage) 2000. 
 
Cutler, David and Louise Sheiner. "Managed Care and the Growth of Medical Expenditures," NBER 
Working Paper #6140, Cambridge MA, August 1997. 
 
Cutler, David and Jonathan Gruber. "Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?" Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, May 1996. 
 
Dolan, Maura. "Ruling Limits Damages in Girl's Death at Hospital", Los Angeles Times, Friday 
March 26, 1999. 
 
Duggan, Mark. "Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending", The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics,  2000. 
 
Duke, Kathryn. "Hospitals in a Changing Health Care System", Health Affairs, 15 #2, 1996, 49-61. 
 
Frank, Richard and David Salkever. "The Supply of Charity Services by Nonprofit Hospitals: Motives 





Frank, Richard, David Salkever, and Jean Mitchell. "Market Forces and the Public Good: 
Competition Among Hospitals and Provision of Indigent Care", Advances in Health Economics and 
Health Services Research, 11, 1990, 159-183. 
 
Group Health Association of America.  National Directory of HMOs.  Washington, DC: GHAA, 
1988-1991. 
Gruber, Jonathan. "The Effect of Competition Pressure in Medical Markets: Hospital Responses to 
Price Shopping in California", Journal of Health Economics, 38 (1994) 183-212. 
 
Hadley, J. and J. Feder. "Hospital Cost Shifting and Care for the Uninsured", Health Affairs, 4 #3, 
1985, 67-80. 
 
Hoynes, Hillary. "Local Labor Markets and Welfare Spells: Do Demand Conditions Matter?", NBER 
Working Paper #5644, July 1996. 
 
Interstudy.  Competitive Edge.  Excelsior, MN: Interstudy, 1992-1996. 
 
Lewin, L.S. and M.E. Lewin. "Financing Charity Care in an Era of Competition", Health Affairs, 6 
#1, 1987, 47-60. 
 
Lipson, Debra and Naomi Naierman. "Effects of Health System Changes on Safety-Net Providers" 
Health Affairs, 15 #2, 1996, 33-48. 
 
Noether, Monica, "Competition Among Hospitals", Journal of Health Economics, 7, 1988, 259-284. 
 
Norton, Edward and Douglas Staiger. “How Hospital Ownership Affects Acces to Care for the 
Uninsured”, RAND, 25 #1, Spring 94, 171-185. 
 
Pauly, Mark. "Nonprofit Firms in Medical Markets", American Economic Review, 77 #2, May 1987, 
257-262. 
  
Public Citizen. Public Citizen’s Research Group Report on Questionable Hospitals 
(Washington D.C.: Public Citizen) July 2001. 
 
Reinhardt, Uwe. "Uncompensated Hospital Care" in Uncompensated Hospital Care, Rights and 
Responsibilities, Frank Sloan, J.A. Blumstein and J.M. Perrin (eds) (Baltmore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press) 1986. 
 
Sloan, Frank, M.A. Morrissey, and J. Valvona. "Hospital Care for the 'Self-Pay' Patient", Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy, and Law, 13 #1, 1988, 83-102. 
 




of Charity Care" Economic Inquiry, 29 #3, July 91, 472-484. 
 
Tranquada, Robert. "Just Where Will L.A.'s Sick Go?", Los Angeles Times, Monday July 5, 1999. 
 





  Table 1: HMO Penetration Rates in California 
County  Dec-88  Dec-89 Dec-90 Dec-91 Jul-92 Jul-93 Jul-94 Jul-95  Jul-96  Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 
Alameda 41.7%  44.3%  43.0% 44.7% 48.8% 40.6% 43.6%  48.9% 58.8% 44.1% 42.3% 46.8% 53.1% 62.8% 
Alpine 3.2%  3.7%  4.4% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 
Amador 27.8%  29.5%  32.4% 31.9% 27.9% 29.2% 35.1%  37.5% 48.8% 28.0% 29.7% 37.3% 38.9% 50.1% 
Butte 3.2%  3.7%  4.4% 4.4% 9.2% 11.3% 14.3%  20.4% 23.4% 12.3% 12.1% 16.3% 21.6% 22.4% 
Calaveras. 3.2%  3.7%  6.3% 7.1% 2.6% 5.3% 6.1%  10.4% 13.6% 2.8% 5.5% 6.4%  10.6% 13.6% 
Colusa 3.2%  3.7%  4.4% 5.3% 5.8% 6.9%  9.1%  13.1% 16.3% 8.2%  7.3% 10.3% 13.4% 16.3% 
Contra Costa  43.5%  46.3%  45.3% 49.3% 43.9% 43.3% 46.3%  48.9% 61.6% 46.7% 45.1% 50.2% 53.1% 65.3% 
Del Norte  3.2%  3.7%  4.5% 5.7% 0.4% 2.3% 3.1%  3.6% 7.4% 0.6% 2.6% 3.3% 4.0% 7.6% 
El Dorado  29.5%  31.0%  33.8% 33.0% 31.5% 34.9% 40.0%  44.5% 58.4% 33.9% 35.6% 42.0% 46.1% 58.9% 
Fresno 29.5%  31.5%  35.3% 36.1% 39.2% 36.7% 39.5%  41.7% 53.8% 39.9% 37.6% 37.8% 43.7% 55.5% 
Glenn 3.2%  3.7%  6.3% 7.1% 5.4% 6.4% 8.0%  16.6% 22.1% 7.9% 7.0% 9.6%  17.5% 21.1% 
Humboldt 3.2%  3.7%  4.5% 4.9% 3.7% 8.0% 10.1%  11.5% 15.9% 3.9%  8.7% 10.8% 12.6% 16.5% 
Imperial 3.2%  3.7%  4.5% 4.4% 0.9% 3.5% 5.3%  5.5% 9.7% 1.0% 4.4% 5.8% 6.3% 10.2% 
Inyo 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0%  3.1% 6.5% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 3.2% 6.0% 
Kern 15.4%  16.8%  17.9% 22.5% 25.8% 28.8% 34.8%  36.0% 39.5% 26.6% 30.3% 34.7% 38.2% 38.5% 
Kings 27.8%  29.5%  33.2% 33.5% 35.2% 35.0% 40.7%  38.1% 53.0% 36.0% 35.6% 40.9% 39.7% 53.4% 
Lake 3.2%  12.1%  14.6% 14.8% 16.3% 16.0% 19.8%  21.9% 31.4% 16.7% 16.7% 21.2% 23.5% 31.9% 
Lassen 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5%  0.4% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 0.4% 3.7% 
Los Angeles  27.7%  30.6%  35.8% 35.3% 28.9% 32.1% 35.4%  39.4% 42.6% 30.0% 34.8% 38.2% 40.8% 41.7% 
Madera 29.5%  31.5%  33.5% 33.7% 37.8% 36.7% 38.7%  41.8% 52.8% 38.4% 37.6% 37.2% 43.8% 54.4% 
Marin 50.5%  52.2%  47.9% 47.6% 44.5% 49.4% 49.8%  55.9% 69.5% 46.8% 50.9% 51.4% 60.5% 73.4% 
Mariposa 3.2%  3.7%  4.4% 7.8% 9.5% 7.5% 6.8%  7.8% 11.8% 9.8% 7.9% 4.1% 8.6% 12.2% 
Mendocino 3.2%  12.1%  14.6% 14.8% 13.7% 16.0% 19.8%  22.9% 28.3% 14.0% 16.7% 21.2% 24.5% 28.8% 
Merced 3.2%  3.7%  11.6% 12.4% 16.5% 71.4% 14.2%  20.5% 25.6% 17.6% 15.4% 12.1% 22.2% 26.3% 
Modoc 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5%  0.4% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 0.4% 3.7% 
Mono 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0%  3.1% 6.5% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 3.2% 6.0% 
Monterey 3.2%  3.7%  4.5% 4.4% 0.5% 8.0% 10.1%  11.5% 14.2% 0.7%  8.7% 10.8% 12.6% 13.6% 
Napa 30.6%  32.6%  34.5% 33.6% 36.6% 40.1% 40.8%  20.3% 24.6% 38.7% 41.8% 42.3% 22.0% 28.5% 
Nevada 3.6%  4.0%  6.5% 6.5% 6.2% 8.0% 15.1%  18.5% 24.6% 6.5%  8.6% 17.0% 19.5% 25.0% 
Orange 27.1%  29.7%  33.0% 32.0% 25.1% 32.0% 33.8%  37.6% 41.6% 25.6% 33.1% 36.6% 39.9% 40.5% 
Placer 29.5%  31.0%  35.3% 34.4% 31.1% 39.2% 40.0%  45.3% 60.6% 32.6% 40.7% 42.0% 47.0% 64.3% 
Plumas 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 2.1% 2.2%  4.3% 7.5% 2.1% 2.2% 2.6% 4.4% 7.7% 
Riverside 25.6%  29.0%  28.2% 30.9% 25.3% 31.3% 32.7%  36.6% 40.5% 26.0% 32.8% 35.5% 38.8% 39.3% 
Sacramento 33.5%  34.7%  37.0% 36.4% 38.7% 39.2% 40.0%  47.4% 60.6% 40.7% 40.7% 42.0% 49.4% 64.3% 
San Benito  3.2%  3.7%  4.4% 4.4% 3.3% 3.1% 6.2%  4.3% 7.5% 3.3% 3.2% 6.8% 4.4% 7.7% 
San Bernardino  24.7%  29.5%  33.0% 32.3% 32.8% 31.6% 34.0%  37.8% 41.8% 34.1% 33.2% 36.7% 40.1% 40.8% 
San Diego  29.0%  27.8%  29.7% 27.8% 26.7% 25.3% 31.4%  35.8% 39.5% 27.8% 27.0% 34.3% 37.9% 39.0% 
San Francisco  45.7%  44.9%  43.1% 45.0% 40.2% 39.9% 42.0%  44.9% 57.8% 42.7% 41.1% 44.9% 48.7% 61.6% 
San Joaquin  36.2%  37.4%  39.7% 40.1% 42.9% 39.2% 44.3%  51.4% 71.1% 44.4% 41.0% 46.8% 53.7% 77.4% 
San Luis Obispo  3.2%  3.7%  4.4% 4.4% 8.8% 13.3% 14.5%  20.7% 22.8% 9.5% 13.9% 15.9% 22.3% 23.0% 
San Mateo  42.5%  44.2%  42.3% 41.4% 40.8% 40.7% 43.3%  47.5% 58.4% 43.2% 42.4% 46.5% 51.6% 62.4% 
Santa Barbara  5.1%  5.9%  8.6% 10.0% 11.9% 14.5% 20.0%  24.1% 29.0% 12.7% 15.3% 22.8% 25.9% 27.5% 
Santa Clara  41.5%  44.2%  39.1% 42.0% 41.5% 41.0% 43.6%  47.8% 26.4% 44.5% 42.6% 46.8% 51.9% 29.1% 
Santa Cruz  5.8%  5.6%  6.5% 7.1% 10.5% 11.6% 14.2%  20.3% 23.5% 12.1% 12.8% 15.4% 23.8% 23.0% 
Shasta 3.2%  3.7%  4.5% 4.9% 0.4% 0.6% 3.4%  3.2% 7.2% 0.6% 0.6% 3.6% 3.5% 7.3% 
Sierra 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 2.1% 0.0%  4.3% 7.5% 2.1% 2.2% 0.0% 4.4% 7.7% 
Siskiyou 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.4% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 3.7% 




Table 1 (continued): HMO Penetration Rates in California 
County  Dec-88  Dec-89 Dec-90 Dec-91 Jul-92 Jul-93 Jul-94  Jul-95  Jul-96  Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 
Sonoma 39.7%  39.9% 46.2%  47.0% 44.1% 50.7%  51.6% 58.4% 41.0% 46.3%  52.6%  53.5%  63.2%  43.8% 
Stanislaus 5.6%  9.8% 11.9%  13.4% 16.1% 11.8%  17.5% 24.4% 27.1% 17.7%  13.0%  19.7%  26.0%  26.6% 
Sutter 27.8%  29.5% 32.4%  32.3% 33.9% 34.4%  39.1% 42.8% 54.3% 36.4%  35.0%  41.4%  44.3%  55.7% 
Tehama 3.2%  3.7% 6.3%  6.3% 2.6% 1.8%  4.1%  7.9%  13.2% 2.8% 1.9% 4.6% 8.4%  13.1% 
Trinity 3.2%  3.7% 4.5%  4.9% 0.4% 0.6%  3.1% 0.8% 4.2% 0.6%  0.6%  3.3%  0.9%  4.5% 
Tulare 27.8%  29.5% 33.2%  33.5% 32.1% 30.6%  35.9% 39.0% 54.3% 32.2%  30.8%  35.5%  40.7%  54.7% 
Tuolumne 3.2%  3.7% 8.9%  12.4% 11.7% 9.8%  11.6% 10.4% 15.3% 13.5%  10.8%  13.2%  10.6%  15.4% 
Ventura 10.7%  17.5% 20.7%  23.6% 34.3% 31.2%  32.3% 36.0% 40.4% 31.5%  32.1%  35.0%  38.2%  39.4% 
Yolo 30.7%  32.3% 35.3%  32.8% 35.8% 39.2%  42.4% 48.9% 61.3% 38.1%  41.2%  44.7%  50.8%  65.2% 
Yuba 27.8%  29.5% 32.4%  31.9% 33.9% 34.4%  33.9% 42.8% 54.3% 36.4%  35.0%  35.4%  44.3%  55.7% 
                             





  Table 2: Average Share of County's Total Discharges 
  Accounted for by Each Hospital Type, 1988 and 1996  
 
   1988    1996 
 Priv.For  Private    Priv.For  Private 
 Profit  Non-Profit  Public  Profit  Non-Profit  Public 
Medicaid  and .127 .486 .387  .147 .575  .277 
  Uninsured  (.027)  (.051)  (.041)  (.031)  (.030)  (.029) 
Uninsured  .131 .448 .420  .106 .450  .444 
  (.034) (.033) (.044)  (.025) (.057)  (.063) 
Medicaid  .125 .506 .369  .156 .602  .242 
 (.027)  (.64)  (.045)  (.033)  (.028)  (.029) 
Medicaid  Births  .130 .474 .396  .173 .613  .214 
  (.030) (.075) (.055)  (.038) (.028)  (.038) 
Other  Medicaid  .120 .541 .339  .135 .588  .277 
  (.024) (.052) (.037)  (.029) (.041)  (.028) 
Private  .171 .733 .097  .162 .717  .121 
  (.040) (.027) (.033)  (.031) (.022)  (.033) 
Medicare  .173 .690 .136  .147 .782  .071 
  (.033) (.030) (.042)  (.026) (.022)  (.020) 
 
# Hospitals  135  243  94  116  240  85 
 
 
Notes: Shares are weighted by the 1988 county caseloads of each type.  One county that did not have 




  Table 3: The Average Hospital's Share of Discharges of Each Kind,  
  Average Revenues, and Average Costs, by Hospital Type  
 
 All  Private  Private 
 Hospitals  For-Profit  Non-Profit  Public   
Panel A: Full Sample of 4055 Hospital Years 
Medicaid and Uninsured  .312  .281  .246  .589 
 (.007)  (.009)  (.005)  (.019) 
Uninsured .071  .060  .050  .156 
 (.002)  (.002)  (.001)  (.007) 
Medicaid .241  .221  .196  .432 
 (.005)  (.009)  (.005)  (.014) 
Medicaid Births  .137  .137  .109  .246 
 (.003)  (.007)  (.003  (.009) 
Other Medicaid  .104  .084  .087  .187 
 (.003)  (.003)  (.002)  (.008) 
Private Payer  .403  .411  .458  .186 
 (.005)  (.008)  (.005)  (.011) 
Medicare .256  .285  .268  .183 
 (.003)  (.006)  (.003)  (.009) 
Revenue per discharge  7824  6825  7986  8107 
 (92)  (119)  (106)  (285) 
Cost per discharge  7735  6593  7861  8245 
 (81)  (106)  (104)  (208) 
# Observations  4055  1070  2180  805   
 
Panel B: Fixed Sample of Hospitals--3528 Hospital Years 
Medicaid and Uninsured  .315  .286  .248  .593 
 (.007)  (.010)  (.005)  (.020) 
Uninsured .071  .060  .051  .158 
 (.002)  (.002)  (.001)  (.007) 
Medicaid .244  .226  .197  .436 
 (.006)  (.009)  (.005)  (.014) 
Medicaid Births  .139  .140  .110  .248 
 (.003)  (.007)  (.003)  (.009) 
Other Medicaid  .105  .085  .087  .187 
 (.003)  (.003)  (.002)  (.008) 
Private Payer  .400  .404  .457  .185 
 (.006)  (.008)  (.005)  (.012) 
Medicare .255  .290  .268  .180 
 (.003)  (.007)  (.003)  (.009) 
Revenue per discharge  7834  6769  7997  8073 




Cost per discharge  7716  6437  7849  8199 
 (84)  (103)  (107)  (211) 
# Observations  3528  823  1966  739   
 
 





  Table 4: Effects of HMO Penetration on the Share of County Caseloads  
  Seen at Public Hospitals 
 
 Medicaid    All  Medicaid  Other  Private    Variable 
  &  Unins. Unins. Medicaid Births Medicaid Payer Medicare  Mean 
HMO  Percent .214 .239 .144 .150 .220 .192 .234  .350 
  (.075) (.108) (.094) (.109) (.090) (.065) (.061)  (.008) 
Predicted  -.641 2.04 -1.41 -2.35 -.490 .744 .774  .221 
    Medicaid  (.383) (.554) (.484) (.563) (.460) (.335) (.313)  (.005) 
Predicted  -1.16 -.641 -1.53 -2.42 -1.09 .113  .163  .063 
    Uninsured  (.460) (.665) (.581) (.674) (.552) (.402) (.376)  (.002) 
% Firm Size  .720  -2.15  1.70  2.73  -.592  -1.49  -2.46  .207 
    >  50  (.955) (1.38) (1.21) (1.40) (1.15) (.834) (.781)  (.008) 
%  Agriculture 3.94 -2.29 2.97 5.66 -.692 4.94 4.90  .004 
    &  Mining  (3.16) (4.56) (3.99) (4.62) (3.79) (2.76) (2.58)  (.002) 
%  Manufac-  -.072 -.087 -.482 -.529 1.34  1.89  3.54  .094 
    turing  (.988) (1.43) (1.25) (1.45) (1.19) (.863) (.808)  (.004) 
%  Trade  .116 -.421 .954 .770 .512 .204 -.241  .132 
  (1.07) (1.55) (1.35) (1.57) (1.28) (.934) (.874)  (.002) 
% Services  -.905  1.98  -2.41  -4.39  .595  1.15  2.97  .167 
  (.959) (1.39) (1.21) (1.43) (1.15) (.838) (.784)  (.005) 
%  Unclassified  8.40 35.33  -5.59 .166 -6.36 -3.00 -6.65  .001 
    sector  (5.10) (7.37) (6.44) (7.47) (6.12) (4.45) (4.17) (.0002) 
HSA  Wage  8.53 6.64 8.52  14.77  7.55 -3.54  -2.89  .026 
  (3.61) (5.22) (4.56) (5.32) (4.33) (3.15) (2.95) (.0004) 
R-squared  .954 .900 .941 .938 .946 .946 .962 
 
 
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the total number of discharges in the county in 1988.  There are 265 
county year observations.  Regressions also included year and county dummies.  Standard errors in 
parentheses.  The percent employed, etc. variables refer to the percent of employees in the county who 
fall in the particular firm size or industrial sector category.  The omitted sector group is the percentage 
of the county population that is not employed.  The wage is the total wage bill in the HSA divided by 
the number of workers, divided by 1,000.  Thus, the mean of .026 means that the average worker in a 




  Table 5: Effects of HMO Penetration on Individual Hospital's Shares  
  of Various Types of Patients, Private vs. Public Hospitals 
 
 Medicaid    All  Medicaid  Other  Private   
 &  Unins.  Unins.  Medicaid  Births  Medicaid  Payer  Medicare 
HMO  Percent  .153 .017 .169 .208 -.038  -.057  -.019 
  (.072) (.066) (.106) (.124) (.032) (.041) (.035) 
HMO * Private  -.200  .005  -.204  -.232  .027  .086  .004 
  (.072) (.074) (.120) (.138) (.039) (.050) (.030) 
Private  .074 .029 .045 .056 -.010  -.048 .002 
  (.030) (.024) (.042) (.047) (.014) (.022) (.015) 
Predicted  .002 -.084 .086 .028 .058 -.107 .074 
    Medicaid  (.034) (.021) (.034) (.025) (.026) (.035) (.017) 
Predicted  .213  .628 -.415 -.231 -.184 -.137 -.019 
    Uninsured  (.060) (.073) (.080) (.063) (.041) (.051) (.031) 
%  Firm  Size  -.606 -.085 -.521 -.503 -.018 .899  .129 
    >  50  (.279) (.135) (.230) (.202) (.144) (.304) (.262) 
%  Agriculture  -.785 .275 -1.06 -.413 -.647 -2.32 2.12 
    or  Mining  (1.05) (.454) (.980) (.921) (.434) (.817) (.932) 
%  Manufacturing  -.476 -.238 -.238 .335 -.573 -.354 .153 
  (.305) (.135) (.277) (.235) (.151) (.307) (.316) 
%  Trade  .589 .270 .319 .774 -.456  -.573  -.154 
  (.344) (.151) (.300) (.267) (.152) (.353) (.295) 
%  Services  -.282 -.043 -.239 -.157 -.081 -1.02 .666 
  (.305) (.160) (.246) (.214) (.172) (.357) (.305) 
%  Unclassified  3.30 2.32 .972 1.97 -1.00  -3.00  -.600 
  (2.39) (1.09) (1.78) (1.62) (.593) (1.65) (1.71) 
HSA  Wage  -5.17 -1.88 -3.29 -.386 -2.90 3.63  1.36 
  (1.36) (.658) (1.28) (1.08) (.664) (1.39) (1.16) 
R-squared  .959 .885 .939 .891 .944 .932 .894 
 
 
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the total number of discharges in the hospital in 1988.  There are 
3528 hospital-year observations.  Regressions also included  hospital fixed effects, year dummies, and 
interactions between year dummies and “private”.  Standard errors are corrected for clustering within 




    Table 6: Effects of HMO Penetration on Individual Hospital's Shares  
  of Various Types of Patients, Private For-Profit, Non-Profit, and Public Hospitals 
 
 Medicaid    All  Medicaid  Other  Private   
 &  Unins.  Unins.  Medicaid  Births  Medicaid  Payer  Medicare 
HMO  Percent  .149 -.017 .166 .205 -.039 -.054 -.019 
  (.072) (.065) (.106) (.124) (.037) (.039) (.036) 
HMO  *  Private  -.063 -.026 -.038 -.097 .059 -.233 .159 
  (.093) (.076) (.123) (.140) (.056) (.108) (.059) 
HMO * Private *  -.131  .033  -.165  -.136  -.029  .340  -.176 
    Non-Profit  (.067) (.022) (.073) (.053) (.038) (.108) (.055) 
Private  .094 .042 .052 .049 .003 .043 -.092 
  (.035) (.024) (.044) (.026) (.018) (.045) (.025) 
Private  Non-  -.020 -.015 -.005 .008 -.013 -.102 .103 
    Profit  (.023) (.007) (.025) (.019) (.014) (.045) (.024) 
Predicted  .003 -.085 .088 .030 .058 -.112 .076 
    Medicaid  (.033) (.021) (.033) (.026) (.026) (.034) (.027) 
Predicted  .212  .627 -.415 -.231 -.184 -.143 -.014 
    Uninsured  (.060) (.073) (.080) (.062) (.041) (.051) (.034) 
%  Firm  Size  -.536 -.098 -.439 -.438 -.001 .757  .191 
    >  50  (.271) (.138) (.226) (.202) (.137) (.302) (.259) 
%  Agriculture  -.782 .295 -1.08 -.439 -.638 -2.17 1.99 
    or  Mining  (1.04) (.455) (.974) (.915) (.431) (.788) (.920) 
%  Manufacturing  -.506 -.236 -.270 .313 -.582 -.322 .151 
  (.301) (.135) (.274) (.236) (.149) (.317) (.306) 
%  Trade  .537 .290 .247 .711 -.464  -.388  -.267 
  (.343) (.151) (.300) (.262) (.155) (.356) (.293) 
%  Services  -.334 -.043 -.291 -.193 -.098 -.989 .682 
  (.298) (.161) (.240) (.211) (.170) (.352) (.295) 
%  Unclassified  3.27 2.25 1.02 2.06 -1.04  -3.57  -.102 
  (2.35) (1.09) (1.76) (1.61) (.590) (1.62) (1.63) 
HSA  Wage  -5.28 -1.97 -3.31 -.332 -2.98 3.02  1.96 
  (1.30) (.664) (1.29) (1.09) (.655) (1.37) (1.13) 
R-squared  .959 .885 .940 .892 .944 .933 .895 
 
 
  % Change in Caseloads of Each Type With a 50% Increase in HMO Penetration 
 
Public 12.6*  5.4  19.0    41.3  -10.4  -14.3  -5.2 
 
Private  For-Profit  15.0 -35.8 29.0 39.4* 11.9 -34.8*  24.6* 
 
Private  Non-Profit  -9.1 -9.8 -9.4  -12.7  -5.2 5.8 -6.7 





Notes: Estimates are weighted by the total number of discharges in the hospital in 1988.  There are 
3528 hospital-year observations.  Regressions also included  hospital fixed effects, year effects, and 
year effects interacted with “private”.  Standard errors are corrected for clustering within county-year 
cells and appear in parentheses.  A * indicates that the sum of the coefficients is significantly different 




  Table 7: Effects of HMO Penetration on Hospital Revenues and Costs 
 
  Log Revenue  Log Revenue  Log Cost  Log Cost 
HMO  Percent  -.171  -.151 -.080 -.069 
  (.106)  (.106) (.101) (.101) 
HMO * Private  .184  -.051  .109  -.156 
  (.112)  (.145) (.106) (.138) 
HMO * Private  -  .283  -  .322 
  * Non-Profit    (.100)    (.095) 
Private  -.005  .180 .023 .141 
  (.036)  (.051) (.035) (.049) 
Non-Profit -  -.211  -  -.142 
   (.040)    (.038) 
Predicted  -.184  -.198 -.011 -.023 
  Medicaid  (.069)  (.068)  (.065)  (.065) 
Predicted  -.366  -.358 -.292 -.287 
  Uninsured  (.106)  (.106)  (.101)  (.101) 
% Firm Size  1.51  1.43  .810  .710 
  > 50  (.625)  (.624)  (.593)  (.595) 
%  Agriculture  -3.42  -3.93 -1.51 -1.88 
  or Mining  (1.50)  (1.50)  (1.43)  (1.43) 
% Trade  -.776  -.670  -.008  1.76 
 (.775)  9.774)  (.736)  (.642) 
% Services  -.669  -.694  -.113  .197 
  (.627)  (.625) (.595) (.738)   
%  Unclassified  -5.02  -6.41 -7.61 -.107 
  (3.70)  (3.69) (3.51) (.596) 
HSA Wage  -1.41  -2.89  3.69  2.75 
  (3.13)  (3.13) (2.97) (2.99) 
 
Notes: Estimates are computed using robust regression.  Models also included hospital and year fixed 
effects.  Standard errors in parentheses. 